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Abstract 
Golden parachutes (GPs) have attracted substantial attention from investors and public 
officials for more than two decades. We find that GPs are associated with higher expected 
acquisition premiums and that this association is at least partly due to the effect of GPs on 
executive incentives. However, we also find that firms that adopt GPs experience negative 
abnormal stock returns both during and subsequent to the period surrounding their adoption. This 
finding raises the possibility that even though GPs facilitate some value-increasing acquisitions, 
they do have, on average, an overall negative effect on shareholder wealth; this effect could be 
due to GPs weakening the force of the market for control and thereby increasing managerial 
slack, and/or to GPs making it attractive for executives to go along with some value-decreasing 
acquisitions that do not serve shareholders’ long-term interests. Our findings have significant 
implications for ongoing debates on GPs and suggest the need for additional work identifying the 
types of GPs that drive the identified correlation between GPs and reduced shareholder value.  
Keywords: Golden parachute, executive compensation, corporate governance, acquisitions, 
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1. Introduction 
Golden parachutes (GPs) became common in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the midst of 
unprecedented takeover activity, and they have attracted much debate and substantial attention from 
investors and public officials ever since. In 1984, Congress enacted Sections 280G and 4999 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which seek to discourage GPs with high monetary value by imposing substantial 
tax penalties on their use. Over the past 15 years, precatory resolutions opposing GPs have been brought 
in significant numbers and have generally passed. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act mandated advisory 
shareholder votes on all future adoptions of GPs by public firms.  
In this paper, we contribute to the ongoing debate about GPs by using a long panel dataset from 1990 
to 2007 to empirically assess the effects of GPs. We show that even though GPs are associated with 
higher expected acquisition premiums, they could reduce the value overall for shareholders.   
The first part of our paper focuses on the effect of GPs on unconditional expected acquisition 
premiums (i.e., expected premiums), which is a product of the likelihood of an acquisition and the 
premiums that are conditional on an acquisition. There is a substantial empirical literature examining how 
GPs are associated with the likelihood of an acquisition and with premiums in the event of an acquisition 
(see, most recently, Sokolyk 2011; and Fich, Tran, and Walkling 2013).
1 Our work, however, is the first 
to provide an integrated analysis combining the effects of GPs on both acquisition likelihood and 
premiums. We find that GPs are associated with higher expected acquisition premiums; even though GPs 
                                                 
1 Earlier studies examining the relationship of GPs with acquisition likelihood include Harris (1990); Machlin, Choe, 
and Miles (1993); Cotter and Zenner (1994); Born and Trahan (1993); Hall and Anderson (1997); Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1998); Lefanowicz, Robinson, and Smith (2000); and Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008). Most (but not 
all) of these studies find a positive association between GPs and acquisition likelihood. 
As to the relationship of GPs with premiums in the event of an acquisition, Machlin, Choe, and Miles (1993) 
report a positive correlation between the size of GPs and acquisition premiums. Fich, Tran, and Walkling (2013) 
find a negative association between GPs and premiums in the event of an acquisition. Sokolyk (2011) finds no 
statistically significant relationship between GPs and acquisition premiums. Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) 
present related findings, which we discuss in Section 4 below.    2
are associated with lower premiums in the event of an acquisition, their association with a higher 
acquisition likelihood turns out to dominate the lower premium effect.
2 
Furthermore, we add to the literature by showing that the positive associations between GPs with 
higher acquisition likelihood and higher expected premiums are not wholly due to the “private 
information,” or signaling explanation (Lambert and Larcker 1985), which argues that GPs are adopted 
when managers have private information indicating a high likelihood of acquisition. Instead, our findings 
show that these positive associations are at least partly driven by the effect of GPs on executives’ 
incentives, under which acquisitions become more attractive to managers (Lambert and Larcker 1985; 
Jensen 1988; Kahan and Rock 2002).
3  If these associations were solely driven by the signaling 
explanation, we would expect them to be driven by “fresh” GPs (i.e., GPs that were recently adopted). We 
find, however, that both “fresh” and “older” GPs are positively and significantly associated (with similar 
magnitudes) with acquisition likelihood as well as with unconditional expected premiums. These findings 
are thus consistent with the possibility that the positive associations between GPs and both acquisition 
likelihood and expected premiums are at least partially due to the effect on executives’ incentives.  
The second part of our paper, which provides the paper’s most important contribution, assesses the 
overall effect of GPs by examining the evolution stock prices prior to, around, and after the adoption of 
GPs. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) note that GPs are negatively correlated with firm value, but they 
do not identify the extent to which this association is driven by a selection effect (a tendency of low-value 
firms to have GPs) and/or by post-adoption changes. Focusing on stock returns over time enables us to 
examine the overall impact of GPs on shareholder value by combining the effects through takeover 
premium channels and stand-alone value channels.  
                                                 
2 An analysis of the relationship of GPs and expected acquisition premiums was introduced in our working paper 
(Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang 2010). Fich, Tran, and Walkling (2013) adopt an approach similar to ours and obtain 
consistent results.  
3 Our results are thus consistent with and complement the significant body of literature showing how acquisition 
decisions are influenced by managers’ private interests (see, e.g., Brickley, Coles, and Terry 1994; Cotter and 
Zenner 1994; Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner 1997; Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Wulf 2004; and Jenter and Lewellen 
2011).    3
We show that firms tend to experience erosion in shareholder value prior to GP adoption and that this 
erosion continues around and subsequent to GP adoption. In particular, we find that (i) among firms that 
do not have GPs, those that adopt them by the next Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) 
volume experience lower abnormal stock returns during the intervolume period (i.e., the period between 
two consecutive IRRC volumes) than firms that do not adopt them by the next IRRC volume, (ii) firms 
that adopt GPs and maintain them in the long run experience lower abnormal stock returns following 
adoptions than firms that do not have GPs and do not adopt them subsequently, and (iii) the post-adoption 
negative abnormal returns persists even when we include the acquisition premiums earned by the acquired 
firms.  
The findings on the erosion of shareholder value following GP adoption could be at least partly 
driven by a “managerial slack” effect: such an effect can occur with a weakening of the discipline of the 
market for corporate control (Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003), and GPs 
weaken this market discipline by making managers less fearful of acquisitions (Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell 2009). In addition, the erosion of value following GP adoption could be at least partly driven by a 
“selling-out” effect: executives might have some private information about the long-term independent 
value of their company, and GPs that are large enough might give them incentives to go along with an 
acquisition even when the their private information indicates that doing so would not be in the 
shareholders’ long-term interest. However, our finding about the relationship between GPs and 
shareholder value provide no support for the view that, by weakening the pressures of the market for 
corporate control, GPs bring about increased firm value by inducing more focus on the long term (Stein 
1988) or by encouraging executives to invest in firm-specific human capital (Jensen 1988; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1989).  
Because our stock return results include gains from acquisitions, our findings suggest that, 
notwithstanding their beneficial impact on acquisition premiums, the net overall effect of GPs is, on 
average, negative. Thus, our analysis reaches a less favorable conclusion concerning the use of GPs than   4
does much of the literature, which has focused on the effect of GPs on acquisitions and not on their 
overall effect on shareholder value.  
We would like to stress the “on average” aspect of our conclusion that GPs are, on average, 
associated with reduced value for shareholders. Our findings do not rule out the possibility that the use of 
certain types of GPs or of GPs in certain circumstances may have overall positive effects on shareholder 
wealth. Identifying which uses of GPs drive our “on average” results and which uses, if any, have overall 
positive effects on shareholder wealth is an interesting subject for future empirical work.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data sources and provides 
summary statistics. Section 3 analyzes the relationship between GPs and expected acquisition premiums. 
Section 4 analyzes the relationship between GPs and evolution of firm value over time. Section 5 presents 
our conclusion. 
 
2. Data and Summary Statistics 
2.1 The Data  
Our data on GPs come from the eight volumes published by IRRC on the following dates: September 
1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, November 1999, February 2002, January 2004, and January 
2006. Each IRRC volume tracks a wide range of corporate governance provisions, including the variable 
of interest “Golden Parachute”—a binary variable indicating whether a firm has a GP at each of the 
above publication dates—for 1,400 to 2,000 firms that comprise the S&P500 and other firms that IRRC 
considers to be important. 
The IRRC dataset offers at least three distinct advantages for the study of GPs. First, IRRC provides 
comprehensive coverage of firms: any given IRRC volume covers over 90% of the combined market 
capitalization of the AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ exchanges. Second, this dataset data set allows us to 
construct a long time series spanning almost 20 years. Third, IRRC tracks a host of other corporate 
governance provisions for a given firm, allowing researchers to control for the structure and strength of   5
corporate governance when identifying the effect of GPs on takeover likelihood, acquisition premiums, 
and shareholder value. 
To conduct our analyses, we construct two panel datasets based on the IRRC data that are merged 
with the CRSP-Compustat merged sample (CCM): one dataset is updated annually; the other is updated 
on each IRRC publication date. The annual dataset is constructed as follows: Since governance data are 
updated every two to three years, we impute the intervolume values of the governance provisions using 
the forward-fill method of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) (GIM).
4 The forward-fill results in an 
annual dataset of governance provisions that
 we merge with annual financial data from CCM according to 
fiscal year and permno (the CRSP firm identifier). The volume-by-volume dataset is constructed by 
merging the eight volumes of IRRC governance data with CCM according to the fiscal year ending 
closest and prior to the current date of each IRRC volume.  
The strength of the annual dataset is the increased sample and the higher frequency with which we 
observe relevant firm outcomes (e.g., being taken over) and other financial characteristics (e.g., Tobin’s 
Q). The strength of the volume-by-volume dataset is the accuracy in the governance data, which is up-to-
date as of the publication date of each IRRC volume. Our analyses use the strengths of both datasets to 
establish the associations of GPs with acquisition likelihood, acquisition premiums conditional on a bid, 
and ex-ante premiums. We also use the volume-by-volume dataset to explore the evolution of firm 
valuation and returns prior to, around, and after GP adoptions.  
For both datasets, our analyses exclude dual-class firms and real estate investment trusts, following 
GIM, because of these firms’ unique governance structures and regulations. We also merge ExecuComp 
data to incorporate information on firm chief executive officer (CEO) and insider characteristics, such as 
CEO age, tenure, and top-five insider ownership.  
For our analysis of takeover likelihood and takeover premiums, we code as acquisitions all deals 
designated as “Mergers,” “Acquisitions,” and “Acquisitions of Majority Interest” from Securities Data 
                                                 
4 We also attempt different filling methods, such as backward filling and random filling, and find our results to be 
robust to the choice of filling method.   6
Company (SDC) Platinum. Spinoffs in which the acquirers are shareholders of the firm are excluded from 
our sample. Permnos for target firms are obtained by matching target firm CUSIPs, or by hand matching 
target names if CUSIP matches are not found. This results in a final sample of 10,856 announced takeover 
bids from 1990 to 2007, covering 9,277 target firms. Using these data, we follow the procedure described 
in Bates and Lemmon (2003) to assign auction sequences and identify initial bids in an auction. (An 
“initial bid” is when there is no announced takeover bid 365 calendar days prior to the announcement date 
and a “follow-on bid” is when another takeover attempt is announced within 365 calendar days prior to a 
bid.) Our analysis of takeover premiums focuses on the one-week and four-week acquisition premiums, as 
reported in SDC, which are the price per share paid by the acquirer divided by the target price one week 
and four weeks prior to the announcement date. Finally, these data are merged with our annual and 
volume-by-volume IRRC data by CRSP identifier, yielding 1,418 initial bids and 1,081 completed 
acquisitions in our sample.  
  For the annual dataset we define two primary variables of interest for our analyses of takeover 
likelihood: an indicator that a firm receives an initial bid in the calendar year following the current year of 
the IRRC volume (“Received Bid Next Year”) and an indicator that a firm is acquired in the calendar year 
following the current year of the IRRC volume (“Acquired Next Year”). To illustrate, a firm that receives 
a bid and is acquired in the year 2002 receives bid = 1 and acquired = 1 in the data matched to the 2001 
IRRC volume. Similarly, for the volume-by-volume merged sample, we define the following two primary 
variables: an indicator that a firm receives an initial bid by the current date of the following IRRC volume 
(“Received Bid by Next IRRC Vol”) and an indicator that a firm is acquired by the current date of the 
following IRRC volume (“Acquired by Next IRRC Vol”).  
 
2.2 Summary Statistics 
  Table 1 reports summary statistics on the stock and adoption of GPs in each of the eight IRRC 
volumes. Panel A shows that the use of GPs has become increasingly prevalent: 50.44% of firms in the 
1990 volume have GPs compared to 77.65% in the 2006 volume. Panel B summarizes the incidence of   7
GP adoption during each intervolume period. We consider a firm a GP adopter if, in the first of two 
consecutive IRRC volumes, it did not have a GP but had a GP in the subsequent volume.
5 We find that 
from 1990 to 2002, the percentage of eligible adopters that adopted GPs in the intervolume period 
steadily rose from 15.81% to 30.02% and declined thereafter to 21.98% in the 2006 volume. On average 
(weighted), 22.29% of eligible adopters adopted a GP in the intervolume period. GP removals also 
occurred, but they were uncommon: in any IRRC volume, less than 5% of firms with GPs dropped them 
by the following volume. 
Table 2 compares the characteristics of firms with and without GPs. For each group, we report 
univariate summary statistics on means and standard deviations, as well as significance levels from an 
unpaired two-sided t-test. Firms with GPs differ from those without them in terms of financial and 
industry characteristics, governance structure, and acquisition likelihood. GP firms have lower industry-
adjusted market capitalization, lower industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q’s, and higher industry-adjusted debt-to-
asset ratios.
6 Furthermore, GP firms are less likely to be Delaware incorporated and from industries with 
greater product market competition as measured by the Herfindahl Index.
7 These univariate statistics 
suggest that firms with GPs face greater threat of takeover. Moreover, these firms are also associated with 
greater protection from takeovers; that is, they are more likely to have a classified board, a poison pill, 
and provisions other than a GP from either the EIndex (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009) or the GIndex 
(Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003). 
Finally, Table 3 provides summary statistics on the relationship between GPs and acquisitions. 
During the 1990–2006 period, the percentage of firms with GPs that received an acquisition bid or were 
                                                 
5 Clearly, this requires the firm to be covered in two consecutive volumes. All such firms are considered “eligible 
adopters.”  
6 Relative market capitalization of a firm is defined as a firm’s market capitalization divided by the median market 
capitalization of all firms covered in CRSP in that year. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the 
book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as book value of assets plus the market value of 
common stock less the sum of book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes (following Kaplan and 
Zingales 1997). Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is equal to Tobin’s Q minus the median Tobin’s Q in the industry. 
Industry relative debt-to-asset ratio is defined as the debt-to-asset ratio minus the industry median debt-to-asset ratio. 
All industry relative measures above use SIC 2-digit definitions. 
7 Following Giroud and Mueller (2011), we define the Herfindahl index based on SIC 3-digit industry definitions.    8
acquired in the following calendar year is consistently greater than the percentage of firms without GPs 
that received an acquisition bid or were acquired in the following calendar year. On average, 6.68% of 
firms with GPs received an acquisition bid in the next year compared to 4.67% of firms without GPs, a 
43% higher likelihood; the average time series difference of 2.01% is statistically significant at the 1% 
level based on a standard two-tailed t-test. 
Moreover, on average, 5.18% of firms with GPs were successfully acquired in the following year 
compared to 3.41% of firms without GPs, a 52% higher likelihood; the average time series difference of 
1.76% is statistically significant at the 1% level based on a standard two-tailed t-test. In Section 3 below, 
we extend this univariate analysis and examine the roles played by incentive and private information 
effects in the relationship between a GP and a higher likelihood of bids. 
3. GPs and Expected Acquisition Premiums 
  We begin our analysis by examining the association between GPs and expected acquisition 
premiums, which are a product of (i) acquisition likelihood and (ii) premium conditional on an 
acquisition. Below, we first study the association between GPs and each of these elements separately 
(Sections 3.1 and 3.2) and then proceed to examine the association between GPs and expected premiums 
(Section 3.3). Finally, we examine whether the positive association identified between GPs and expected 
premiums, as well as the positive association between GPs and acquisition likelihood that drives it, are at 
least partly due to the effect of GPs on incentives rather than a reflection of the influence of private 
information (Section 3.4). 
3.1 GPs and Likelihood of Acquisition 
The summary statistics above indicate that GPs are correlated with a firm’s increased likelihood of 
receiving an offer and of being acquired. However, such correlation might be due to GPs being associated 
with publicly observed variables that are known to be correlated with the likelihood of receiving a bid or 
of being acquired. Such association can arise if executives of firms with such variables rationally exert   9
greater effort to obtain GPs. Indeed, the summary statistics above indicate that GPs are associated with 
publicly observable variables known to be correlated with bids and acquisitions, such as lower firm size 
and lower industry-adjusted Q. However, the question remains: can GPs be expected to be correlated with 
bids and acquisitions after controlling for such variables?  
We explore two hypotheses. First, the incentive hypothesis posits that GPs are expected to be 
positively correlated with bids and acquisitions (controlling for variables known to be correlated with bids 
and acquisitions). By providing executives with an additional monetary benefit in the event of an 
acquisition, GPs lower the premium threshold above which an acquisition would be in the executives’ 
private interests, notwithstanding their loss of some private benefits of control (Lambert and Larcker 
1985; Jensen 1988). Second, the private information hypothesis predicts that, even when one controls for 
publicly observable variables that are associated with an increased likelihood of bids and acquisitions, an 
executive may have private information that his or her company is more likely to receive a bid or be 
acquired than is suggested by the publicly observable variables. An executive who has such private 
information will place greater weight on having a GP (Lambert and Larcker 1985). Thus, this hypothesis 
also predicts a positive association between GPs and the likelihood of receiving a bid or being acquired. 
  Using our annual dataset, we confirm the predictions of these hypotheses empirically by estimating, 
via a probit model, the likelihood of a firm receiving a bid in the next calendar year (“Receive Bid Next 
Year”) and the likelihood of a firm being acquired in the next calendar year (“Acquired Next Year”) as a 
function of whether the firm has a GP and other controls. In unreported tests, we find qualitatively similar 
results with respect to the associations between GPs and acquisition likelihood using a logit specification 
and using a hazard model specification. We control for other corporate governance provisions using three 
additional variables: “EIndex−GP,” the Entrenchment Index minus GP; “GIndex−EIndex,” the GIM 
index minus the value of the Entrenchment Index; and “Delaware Inc,” an indicator of whether the firm is 
incorporated in Delaware.
8 
                                                 
8 In light of the work of Sokolyk (2011), we verify that our results are robust to the inclusion of “Compensation 
Plan”—one of the components of the GIndex not included in the EIndex—as a separate explanatory variable.   10
  Our other financial control variables reflect values in the current fiscal year. “Log(Q)” refers to the 
log of a firm’s Tobin’s Q; “Log(Assets)” is the log of a firm’s total assets; and “Log(Debt/Asset)” is the 
log of a firm’s debt-to-asset ratio. We also include controls for inside ownership (“Inside Ownership”), 
defined as the fraction of shares held by the top five executives (in terms of shares held); log of the CEO’s 
age in years [“Log(CEO Age)”]; and log of the CEO’s tenure in years [“Log(CEO Tenure)”]. We control 
for industry effect by either the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Herfindahl Index), representing the level of 
product market competition in the industry, or by 2-digit SIC (SIC2) industry fixed effects. Our use of the 
Herfindahl Index follows the work by Giroud and Mueller (2011), which documents the possibility that 
corporate governance may matter only for industries with low product market competition. We also 
include year fixed effects. 
Pooled probit estimation results, whose marginal effects evaluated at the means are reported in Table 
4, find a consistent positive association between GPs and the likelihood of an acquisition bid as well as of 
a completed acquisition across our specifications, controlling for firm characteristics and strength of 
takeover protection. The fact that results for takeover likelihood are consistent with those for bid 
likelihood is not surprising since 70% of the auction sequences identified in our sample resulted in 
completed acquisitions in our sample, with an average length to completion (from initial bid) of 167 days. 
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 4, which use the Herfindahl Index as the control for industry (instead of 
using industry fixed effects), report the marginal effect of GPs on bid likelihood and takeover likelihood 
for the average firm (i.e., one that holds the mean values for the control variables) to be 1.48% and 
1.28%, with statistical significance at the 1% level for both. The increase in bid and takeover likelihoods 
amounts to a 26.1% proportional increase in the likelihood of takeover bids and a 32.2% proportional 
increase in the likelihood of acquisition. Therefore, the association between GPs and the higher likelihood 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sokolyk (2011) finds that GPs and compensation plans have positive and significant association with the likelihood 
of an acquisition, but when modeling acquisition premiums, GPs are not significant while compensation plans are. 
To examine whether our results are affected by the inclusion of a compensation plan, we split GIndex-EIndex into 
two parts: (i) a dummy that is equal to 1 if a firm has a compensation plan and (ii) a variable that is equal to all other 
provisions that are in GIndex that are not included in EIndex and are not compensation plans.. Using this 
specification does not change our results in this and subsequent sections.     11
of a bid as well as of a completed acquisition, is both statistically and economically meaningful. The 
marginal effects reported in columns (2) and (4), which include SIC2 industry fixed effects, are nearly 
identical in magnitude and statistical significance to those reported in columns (1) and (3).  
These empirical results are consistent with predictions from both the incentive and private information 
hypotheses. That is, controlling for variables known to correlate with acquisition likelihood, GPs are 
positively associated with acquisition likelihood in a significant and economically meaningful way.  
 
3.2 GPs and Premiums in the Event of an Acquisition 
In the event of an acquisition, the effect of GPs on executive incentives can be expected to lower 
premiums through two channels. First, in those cases in which an acquisition would occur even in the 
absence of GPs, GPs weaken the incentives of executives to bargain hard. In addition, some lower-
premium bids—bids that would not have occurred in the absence of a GP—might become worthwhile for 
those executives once a GP is introduced. 
It should be noted that there is an alternative reason for an association between low premiums and 
special payments to executives in connection with an acquisition—but one that does not seem to apply for 
most GPs in our dataset. Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) examine situations in which CEOs 
negotiating an acquisition also obtain, with the explicit or implicit approval of the buyer, extra payments 
in the form of special bonuses or increased GPs. These authors find that CEOs who obtain such 
acquisition benefits tend to accept lower premiums for their shareholders. The authors reasonably 
interpret this pattern as reflecting a willingness of CEOs to accept a reduction in acquisition premiums in 
return for buyer willingness to let them derive ex post acquisition benefits not allocated to them ex ante.
9 
Unlike the acquisition benefits examined in their paper, for which executives negotiating an acquisition 
need to bargain, the benefits provided to executives under the GPs in our dataset are not ones for which 
executives need to bargain at the time they negotiate an acquisition. These GPs are adopted ex ante and 
                                                 
9 Similarly, Wulf (2004) reports that in mergers of equals, CEOs seem to be willing to accept a lower premium for 
their shareholders when they are awarded a position in the post-merger combined firm.   12
are already set and binding, so the executives need not take any step or make any concession in terms of 
the premium or otherwise in order to benefit from them. 
  Using our annual dataset, we confirm the predictions of the incentives hypothesis by estimating 
pooled regressions of one-week and four-week acquisition premiums on the presence of GPs and other 
controls, such as the firm’s governance structure and financial characteristics. We also control for deal 
characteristics, such as the acquiring firm’s toehold in the acquired firm’s shares prior to the takeover 
announcement, whether a termination fee is in place,
10 whether the acquisition attempt is hostile, whether 
the deal is a tender offer, and whether the deal involves a stock swap. Finally, we also proxy for the 
strength of the negotiating effort by including the time to completion in days [“Log(Time)”], and we 
control for target firms’ CEO characteristics by including the log of CEO age and tenure.  
Our analysis excludes those transactions in which the bidder and the target companies share the same 
parent company, as well as those transactions with non-negative acquisition premiums (840 non-missing 
for the one-week premium and 839 non-missing for the four-week premium),
11 because these transactions 
reflect abnormal takeover circumstances. Including such transactions does not change our results 
qualitatively but generally weakens their statistical significance. 
Pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) results reported in Table 5 show a consistent and negative 
association between GPs and acquisition premiums. Estimation results using the one-week and four-week 
premiums reported in columns (1) and (3) show that the presence of GPs is associated with an average 
reduction in acquisition premiums of 3.57 and 4.33 percentage points. In columns (2) and (4) we use the 
logs of acquisition premiums as the dependent variables because acquisition premiums are positively 
skewed. We find in these columns that the presence of a GP reduces one-week premiums by 12.8% and 
reduces four-week premiums by 19.2%, an economically significant discount. With the exception of 
                                                 
10 Typically, after target and acquiring boards reach a preliminary agreement, the impending deal is announced 
publicly and both sides await target shareholder approval. These preliminary agreements may include a termination 
clause requiring the target firm to pay a fee to the acquirer in the event that the target cancels the agreement in order 
to accept a competing bid.  
11 The 840 transactions with non-missing one-week premiums are not a superset of the 839 transactions with non-
missing four-week premiums. Fifteen observations in the former are not included in the latter, while 18 observations 
in the latter are not included in the former.    13
column (2), the coefficient of GP is significant at the 5% level. In summary, these findings of a negative 
association between GPs and acquisition premiums are consistent with the incentives hypothesis.
12 
 
3.3 Unconditional Expected Premiums 
The above analysis suggests an ambiguous relationship between GPs and the ex ante unconditional 
expected premiums as a result of two counteracting effects. While the presence of GPs is associated with 
an increased likelihood of acquisition and thus the likelihood of realizing acquisition premiums, it is also 
associated with a decrease in the size of premiums in the event of an acquisition. The incentives 
hypothesis is consistent with and predicts these empirical patterns, but it does not generate a clear 
prediction on the product of these two effects. The relationship between GPs and the unconditional 
expected acquisition premiums is therefore an empirical issue. 
We assess this empirical relation using the full sample of firms in our annual dataset, and we follow 
the methodology of Comment and Schwert (1995) by setting the acquisition premiums to zero for all non-
takeover firm-year observations. Table 6 reports pooled OLS estimation results that are similar to those 
shown in Table 5, but it uses the full sample. As in Table 5, we consider one-week and four-week 
premiums in columns (1) and (3), respectively, and the log of the respective premiums in columns (2) and 
(4).
13 However, in Table 6 we control for only those firm characteristics that can be observed ex ante (i.e., 
we ignore those specific to deal characteristics); moreover, we now interpret the coefficients of this model 
as marginal effects on the ex ante unconditional expected acquisition premiums, which combine GP 
effects on acquisition likelihood and the conditional acquisition premiums.  
The results reported in Table 6 show a consistent and positive association between GPs and 
unconditional expected acquisition premiums. Estimation results using the one-week and four-week 
premiums reported in columns (1) and (3), respectively, show that the presence of GPs is associated with 
                                                 
12 In unreported tests, we verify that these findings on the associations between GPs and acquisition likelihood and 
between GPs and acquisition premiums are robust to controlling for the components of the EIndex separately and 
robust to controlling for the presence of a compensation plan. 
13 For the log versions of the variable, we fill in zero for log returns for all non-takeover firm-year observations.   14
an average increase in unconditional acquisition premiums of 36 basis points in both cases. Translating 
these numbers into percentages, the log specifications reported in columns (2) and (4) of Table 6 show 
that the presence of GPs increases one-week unconditional premiums by 3.40% and four-week 
unconditional premiums by 3.67%. These results are not surprising in light of our earlier findings that the 
presence of GPs increases the likelihood of acquisitions proportionally (relative to the mean) by 26–34%, 
while decreasing conditional premiums proportionally by approximately 13–19%. In the aggregate, we 
find a small but positive association between GPs and unconditional premiums. 
 
3.4 Private Information vs. Incentives 
As we previously noted, the empirical associations documented above are consistent with both the 
incentives hypothesis and the private information hypothesis. We empirically examine whether the 
positive associations of GPs with acquisition likelihood and unconditional expected acquisition premiums 
are fully driven by the private information hypothesis by using the timing of GP adoption. If the adoption 
reflects private information regarding an elevated likelihood of a future acquisition, then the positive 
association between GPs and takeover likelihood should be stronger for GPs that are adopted more 
recently, and correspondingly, the positive association between GPs and expected acquisition premiums 
should be stronger for GPs that are fresh. Note that the private information hypothesis does not provide a 
basis for predicting that the negative association between GPs and premiums conditional on an acquisition 
would be different for fresh GPs than for older GPs.   
To test these predictions of private information empirically, we categorize all GPs into “Fresh” and 
“Older” using the volume-by-volume data. We define a firm’s GP to be fresh if it has been recently 
adopted—that is, if the firm did not have a GP in the previous IRRC volume but has a GP in the current 
volume; this makes the GP less than two to three years old. We define a GP to be older if it was adopted 
more than one volume ago—that is, if it is more than two to three years old.   15
In Table 7, Panel A, columns (1) and (2) rerun the probit specifications of columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 6 using the volume-to-volume data, thus focusing on the association between GPs and a firm’s 
likelihood of being acquired by the next volume. As expected, consistent with the results of Table 4, we 
find the coefficient of GP to be positive and statistically significant. The magnitudes of the marginal 
effects on GP are two to three times larger than those shown on Table 4, which is unsurprising as our 
dependent variable is an indicator for being acquired over the next two to three calendar years rather than 
in the next calendar year. 
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 7, Panel A, we repeat the regressions of columns (1) and (2) except 
that we split GPs into “Fresh” and “Older.” Controlling for the strength of takeover protection and firm 
characteristics, we find that the coefficients of both fresh and older GPs are positive and statistically 
significant. Furthermore, while the marginal effect of fresh GPs is slightly larger in magnitude than that of 
older GPs, we find no statistical difference between them (p-value = 0.324). These findings are consistent 
with the view that the positive association of GPs with acquisitions is at least partly due to incentives 
rather than driven solely by private information. 
Panel B of Table 7 examines the associations of fresh and older GPs with unconditional expected 
premiums. We rerun the OLS specifications of Table 6 using volume-by-volume data instead of annual 
data and splitting the GP variable into fresh and older GPs. In all four regressions, we find positive and 
significant associations between unconditional acquisition premiums and both fresh GPs and older GPs. 
Estimation results using one-week [four-week] premiums reported in column (1) [(3)] show that the 
presence of both fresh and older GPs is associated with an average increase in unconditional acquisition 
premiums of 139 [115] and 99 [94] basis points, respectively.  
Translating these figures into percentages, the log specifications reported in column (2) [(4)] of Table 
7, Panel B, show that the presence of fresh and older GPs increases one-week [four-week] unconditional 
premiums by 11.1% [10.16%] and 8.49% [8.69%], respectively. Further, while the marginal effect of 
fresh GPs is somewhat lower than that of older GPs, we find no statistical difference between them in any 
of the four regression specifications (p-value = 0.25, 0.31, 0.47, and 0.53, respectively).   16
  By using the timing of GP adoption, our empirical analysis suggests that the positive associations that 
GPs have with both likelihood of acquisition and unconditional expected premiums are not fully driven 
by the private information hypothesis. In unreported tests, we find that the positive and significant 
association of GPs with likelihood of acquisition and unconditional expected premiums are robust to the 
inclusion of proxies for managers’ expectations of future takeover likelihood.
14 Together,  our 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that these positive associations are at least partly driven by the 
effect of GPs on executive incentives. 
 
4. GPs and Evolution of Shareholder Value 
4.1 The Question 
Having analyzed the effects of GPs on expected acquisition premiums, we now turn to examine the 
overall effects of GPs on shareholder value. One way in which GPs might adversely affect shareholder 
value is through a “managerial slack” effect. The disciplinary force of the market for corporate control is 
often viewed as conducive to reducing managerial slack (Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick 2003). By making acquisitions less costly to executives, or even by making such acquisitions 
beneficial, GPs weaken the disciplinary force of the market for corporate control and can contribute to 
increased managerial slack (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009).  
In addition, GPs might have an adverse effect through what may be termed a “selling-out” effect. It is 
widely believed that executives might have some private information about the long-term independent 
value of their company (Black and Kraakman 2002). When GPs are large enough, they might give 
executives an incentive to go along with an acquisition even when the executives’ private information 
indicates that doing so would not be in the shareholders’ long-term interest. That is, in addition to 
facilitating some acquisitions that increase value from a long-term perspective, GPs that are large enough 
                                                 
14 We control for M&A Intensity and the Forward M&A Intensity. M&A Intensity is the average relative percentage 
of firms, relative to the cross-sectional average, in each SIC3 industry that is taken over in the years between the 
current IRRC and the prior IRRC volume; Forward M&A Intensity is the average relative percentage of firms in 
each SIC3 industry that is taken over in the years between the current IRRC and the next IRRC volume.    17
may facilitate some additional acquisitions that decrease value from such a perspective. Adding such 
acquisitions to the mix increases the expected acquisition premiums that shareholders can be expected to 
capture but does not serve shareholder interests; rather, it can be expected to decrease shareholders’ long-
term returns and, to the extent that it is reflected in current market prices, can be expected to reduce firm 
valuation. 
Finally, we should note two positive effects that GPs might have on shareholder value. By making 
managers less fearful of an acquisition attempt, a GP may (i) reduce short-termism distortions and 
facilitate a long-term focus (Stein 1988) and (ii) encourage managers to make investments in firm-specific 
human capital (Jensen 1988; Shleifer and Vishny 1989).  
Given the lack of an unambiguously clear theoretical prediction, empirical evidence on the subject 
would be useful. Prior work has shown that GPs have a negative, statistically significant, and 
economically meaningful correlation with Tobin’s Q (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009). Such a 
correlation could arise either because GPs have a negative effect on shareholder value or because of a 
selection effect (i.e., the greater tendency of low-value firms to have GPs). However, the current literature 
has not disentangled these two effects, and we therefore proceed to examine further the impact of GPs on 
shareholder value.  
To examine this issue empirically, we study the evolution of shareholder value over time by 
considering the performance of buy-and-hold portfolios. Unlike earlier studies that examine stock returns 
within a short window surrounding the announcements of a GP adoption (Mogavero and Toyne 1995; 
Hall and Anderson 1997), we take a long-horizon approach by considering a two- to three-year window 
prior to, around, and after GP adoption.
15 Since our portfolio return tests include acquisition premiums, 
                                                 
15 Mogavero and Toyne (1995) focus on the 5 trading days prior to and following the announcement date, while Hall 
and Anderson (1997) consider a variety of event windows, with the largest extending from 20 trading days prior to 
the announcement date to 20 trading days following it. Event studies focusing on short windows suffer from the 
uncertainty about what is the appropriate date on which the GP adoption becomes public. Further, adoptions of GPs 
may be correlated with other changes in the firm that may be value relevant, such as changes in other aspects of the 
governance structure. Coates (2000) presents a summary critique of governance-related event studies. We resolve 
some of these difficulties, as did Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), by taking a longer-term horizon approach.    18
this analysis allows us to combine the effects of GPs on shareholder value through both the takeover 
premium channel and the stand-alone value channel. We note that the buy-and-hold portfolios in our tests 
do not represent implementable trading strategies as they use some future information; rather, these 
portfolio return results represent a methodology for examining or tracking the stock performance of firms 
that pursue different paths over time with respect to having a GP.  
 
4.2. Empirical Analysis 
We begin by studying stock returns of firms in the years prior to GP adoption by considering long-
term returns on the following portfolios. We go long a portfolio of stocks (“Future-Adopters”) that adopt 
GPs two volumes from the current one (i.e., with no GPs in the current and next IRRC volumes but with 
GPs in the following one) while simultaneously shorting another portfolio of stocks (“Non-Future-
Adopters”) that do not have GPs in the current and succeeding two IRRC volumes. We consider an equal-
weighted portfolio and a value-weighted portfolio, weighting each stock by its common-stock market 
capitalization. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly; in addition, it is updated when information on firm 
corporate governance provisions becomes available: in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 
1998, November 1999, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006 (the earliest dates on which the 
information in the 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 IRRC volumes, respectively, 
became publicly known). After calculating monthly returns on this portfolio, we estimate its risk-adjusted 
excess returns by estimating the intercept term from the standard four-factor asset-pricing model using the 
Fama and French (1993) three factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor: 
 
        12 3 4 t tt t t t Monthly Portfolio Return Rm Rf SMB HML Carhart             
 
where Rm-Rft, SMBt, and HMLt are the month t market, size, and value factor returns, respectively, and 
Carhartt reflects the momentum factor return.   19
Column (1), Table 8 (9) reports that the value- (equal-) weighted portfolio generates an average 
monthly abnormal return of –59 (–35) basis points from September 1990 to December 2003 that are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. On a compounded annualized basis, these translate to abnormal 
returns of –6.85% (–4.12%), suggesting that firms that adopt GPs two IRRC volumes into the future 
experience an economically significant decline in stock returns relative to firms that do not adopt GPs 
over the same period, consistent with the hypothesis that the adoption of GPs is driven at least partially by 
selection. 
  To study the stock performance around the period of GP adoption, we consider the following 
portfolio strategy. We go long a portfolio of stocks (“Adopters”) that adopt GPs in the next IRRC volume 
(i.e., not in the current volume but in the following one) while simultaneously shorting another portfolio 
of stocks (“Non-Adopters”) that do not have GPs in the current and succeeding IRRC volumes. As above, 
we consider both value- and equal-weighted portfolios, rebalanced monthly, and update portfolios 
whenever new governance information becomes publicly available. 
  Column (2) in Tables 8 and 9 reports that the value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios, 
respectively, produce negative and significant average abnormal monthly returns around the adoption 
period from September 1990 to December 2005. While the value-weighted portfolio produces average 
monthly abnormal returns of –37 basis points, significant at the 5% level, the equal-weighted portfolio 
generates average monthly abnormal returns of –20 basis points, significant at the 10% level. On a 
compounded annualized basis, these translate to an abnormal return of −4.36% for the value-weighted 
portfolio and 2.36% for the equal-weighted portfolio, suggesting that GP adopters tend to experience a 
decline in stock performance relative to non-adopters around the adoption period.  
  Since we do not observe exact GP adoption dates, our finding of a decline in shareholder value 
around GP adoption might be at least partly driven by a selection effect—that is, an executive’s decision 
to adopt a GP in response to a decrease in shareholder value between the time of one IRRC volume and 
the next and/or the executive’s anticipation that shareholder value will decline subsequent to the next   20
volume. Alternatively, these results on the intervolume change in the firm value around GP adoption 
might also be partly due to the negative incentive effects of GPs subsequent to their adoption. 
  To explore the incentive effect further, we complete the analysis by documenting the stock 
performance in the aftermath of GP adoption by considering the following portfolio exercise. We go long 
a portfolio of stocks (“LT Adopters”) that has a GP in the previous, current, and subsequent IRRC 
volumes while simultaneously shorting another portfolio of stocks (“LT Non-Adopters”) that does not 
have GPs in the previous, current, and succeeding IRRC volumes.  
  Column (3), Table 8 (9) finds that from July 1993 to December 2005, the value- (equal-) weighted 
portfolios produce average monthly abnormal returns of –37 (–28) basis points, statistically significant at 
the 5% (5%) level, translating to –4.35% (–3.31%) on a compounded annualized basis. While these 
results are consistent with the continued erosion of shareholder value after GP adoption and thus 
consistent with the managerial incentive effect, it could be suggested that they are driven by a selection 
effect. Under this explanation, the firms with GPs that face higher acquisition likelihood but are not 
acquired for three consecutive IRRC volumes could be very poorly performing firms.  
  To explore this possibility, we rerun the above long-short strategy but include all firms acquired 
between the current and the next IRRC volumes. Ex ante, we should expect the inclusion of these stocks 
to decrease the portfolio abnormal returns, since firms with GPs are more likely to be acquired and should 
therefore be more likely to earn positive acquisition premiums. Column (4), Table 8 (9) reports abnormal 
monthly returns of –32 (–24) basis points for the value- (equal-) weighted portfolio, statistically 
significant at the 5% (5%) level. As expected, these returns are smaller in magnitude (by about 15%) than 
those generated by excluding acquired firms, but they remain negative and statistically significant, 
consistent with the managerial incentive effect.  
  Taken together, the results on the stock returns of long-term adopters versus long-term non-adopters 
suggest that shareholder value tends to deteriorate in the presence of GPs. Moreover, the last set of 
portfolio tests, which incorporates the positive acquisition premiums earned by shareholders of long-term   21
GP firms, is consistent with the hypothesis that GPs have an overall negative effect on firm value; that is, 
the negative effects of GPs dominate the positive effects of facilitating some value-increasing acquisitions.  
 
4.3. Discussion  
We thus find a pattern of deterioration in shareholder value before, around, and after GP adoption. 
Relative to non-adopters, future GP adopters experience a decline in shareholder value prior to adoption, 
consistent with selection; they continue to experience a decline in shareholder value in the window 
around adoption, consistent with both selection and managerial slack; finally, long-term GP adopters 
experience erosion in shareholder value, consistent with managerial slack.  
Overall, the patterns documented here contribute to an understanding of the source of the negative 
association between GPs and firm value identified in prior research. Our findings are consistent with the 
possibility that this negative association is at least partly due to GPs bringing about, rather than merely 
reflecting, reduced value for shareholders.  
Our findings concerning the erosion of shareholder value following GP adoption could be at least 
partly driven by an increased managerial slack due to the weakening effect of GPs on the disciplining 
forces of the market for corporate control. Our findings could also be partly driven by a selling-out effect 
as GPs provide executives with incentives to go along with acquisition even when the executives’ private 
information indicates that doing so would not be in the shareholders’ long-term interest. Our results 
indicate that the combination of managerial slack and the selling-out effect dominates the positive effects 
that GPs may have on shareholder value (e.g., facilitating value-increasing acquisitions, inducing a focus 
on the long-term, or encouraging investment in firm-specific human capital).  
While we find that GPs are, on average, associated with reduced value for shareholders, we do not rule 
out the possibility that some types of GPs—or the use of GPs in certain circumstances—have an overall 
positive effect on shareholder wealth. Future empirical work may build on our findings by examining 
whether such types of GPs or such circumstances can be identified. Such work could assist companies in   22
deciding what types of GPs to adopt and when to adopt them, and could assist shareholders in assessing 
the GPs adopted by companies.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to an understanding of the relationship between GPs and firm and shareholder 
value. We find that GPs are associated with higher expected acquisition premiums and that this 
association is at least partly due to the effect of GPs on executive incentives. However, we also find that, 
notwithstanding this association, firms adopting GPs experience negative abnormal stock returns prior to, 
during, and after the intervolume period of adoption.  
Our findings raise the possibility that, despite their positive effect on facilitating some value-
increasing acquisitions, GPs have, on average, an overall negative effect on shareholder wealth. This 
average negative effect could be due to GPs increasing managerial slack and/or to GPs providing 
executives with incentives to go along with some acquisitions that do not serve shareholder interest.  
Our findings have significant implications for ongoing debates about GPs. They also suggest the need 
for additional empirical work that would seek to identify the types of GPs that drive the identified 
correlation between GPs and reduced shareholder value. We hope that our findings contribute to the 
ongoing discussion and evaluation of GPs by investors and policy makers.   23
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Table 1: Summary Statistics – Stock and Adoption of GPs 
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the stock and the adoption of GPs. Panel A reports summary statistics on the 
stock of GPs–the number and the percentage of firms–in each IRRC volume. Panel B reports summary statistics on 
the adoption of GPs for those firms that appear in two consecutive IRRC volumes—the number of firms without 
GPs in the first of the two IRRC volumes (“Firms w/o GP Initially”) but have GPs by the second volume (“Firms 
adopting GP” or “% of Adopters”).  
 
 
Panel A: Stock of Golden Parachutes    
IRRC Volume 
Firms in  
IRRC Volume 
Firms  
w/ GP 
% of Firms  
w/ GP 
1990 1,467  740  50.44% 
1993 1,463  780  53.32% 
1995 1,496  802  53.61% 
1998 1,913  1060  55.41% 
2000 1,886  1223  64.85% 
2002 1,894  1282  67.69% 
2004 1,982  1455  73.41% 
2006 1,897  1473  77.65% 
 
 Panel B: Adoption of Golden Parachutes 
Years 
Firms in both 
IRRC Volumes 
Firms w/o  
GP Initially 
Firms 
adopting GP  
% of 
Adopters 
1990~1993 1,272  639  101  15.81% 
1993~1995 1,344  641  79  12.32% 
1995~1998 1,214  594  142  23.91% 
1998~2000 1,667  768  214  27.86% 
2000~2002 1,416  533  160  30.02% 
2002~2004 1,654  529  131  24.76% 
2004~2006 1,656  455  100  21.98%   27
Table 2: Summary Statistics – Firms with and without GPs  
 
Table 2 reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of firm characteristics, measured on the as-of date of 
each IRRC volume, for all IRRC firms (“All Firms”), those IRRC firms with GPs (“GP”), and those IRRC firms 
without GPs (“No GP”). The last two columns report the differences in means and the statistical significance from a 
standard unpaired two-sided t-test. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  
 
  
   All Firms  GP  No GP  Difference    
Relative Market Cap  4.273   3.374   5.811   -2.4376 
*** 
   (14.650)  (9.112)  (20.878)    
  
Industry-Relative Q  (SIC2)  0.4658  0.3440  0.6624  -0.3184 
*** 
   (1.481)  (1.231)  (1.796)    
  
Industry-Relative Debt / Asset (SIC2)  0.0575  0.0659  0.0432  0.0227 
*** 
   (0.176)  (0.174)  (0.180)    
  
Delaware Incorporation  0.5582  0.5487  0.5742  -0.0255 
*** 
   (0.497)  (0.498)  (0.495)    
  
Herfindahl Index  0.1628  0.1601  0.1674  -0.0073 
*** 
   (0.147)  (0.145)  (0.150)    
  
Classified Board  0.5833  0.6438  0.4804  0.1634 
*** 
   (0.493)  (0.479)  (0.500)    
  
Poison Pill  0.5339  0.6464  0.3425  0.3039 
*** 
   (0.499)  (0.478)  (0.475)    
  
# of Provisions in EIndex other than GP  1.6826  1.8936  1.3238  0.5698 
*** 
   (1.143)  (1.102)  (1.120)    
  
GIndex - EIndex  6.7097  6.9048  6.3778  0.5270 
*** 
   (1.935)  (1.886)  (1.972)    
  
Acquired by Next Volume  0.0960  0.1134  0.0664  0.0471 
*** 
   (0.295)  (0.317)  (0.249)       
Number of Firms  13,998   8,815  5,183       
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Table 3: Summary Statistics – Incidence of Acquisition 
Table 3 reports, as of the end of each calendar year, summary statistics on the percentage and number (in 
parentheses) of firms with and without GPs (“GP” and “No GP”, respectively) that received an initial bid over the 
next calendar year and the direction of the difference (where “+” [“-”] indicates a greater [smaller] percentage of No 
GP firms receiving acquisition bids or being acquired in the next year). The last two rows report the time series 
average and standard deviation of the annual means and the differences in the annual means. Significance levels for 
a two-sided t-test on the null of no differences between the No GP and GP means are indicated by *, **, and *** for 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
      % Receiving Initial Bid  
in the Next Year 
   % Acquired  
in the Next Year 
  
           
      No GP  GP  Diff     No GP  GP  Diff    
1990     4.6% (28)  4.7% (32)  +     2.5% (15)  2.3% (16)  -    
1991     2.7% (16)  3.6% (24)  +     1.9% (11)  2.6% (17)  +    
1992     3.0% (17)  3.4% (22)  +     2.8% (16)  3.1% (20)  +    
1993     3.2% (19)  4.6% (33)  +     1.9% (11)  2.1% (15)  +    
1994     5.8% (33)  8.0% (56)  +     1.9% (11)  5.5% (38)  +    
1995     4.0% (24)  7.4% (54)  +     2.6% (16)  4.4% (32)  +    
1996     4.8% (28)  9.9% (68)  +     3.9% (23)  8.6% (59)  +    
1997     8.4% (47)  9.1% (57)  +     5.0% (28)  7.3% (46)  +    
1998     7.8% (54)  12.7% (112)  +     6.3% (43)  10.2% (90)  +    
1999     6.2% (41)  9.7% (78)  +     6.5% (43)  9.4% (76)  +    
2000     3.7% (18)  5.1% (48)  +     3.7% (18)  5.6% (52)  +    
2001     1.9% (9)  2.6% (23)  +     1.1% (5)  2.8% (24)  +    
2002     3.5% (17)  3.9% (44)  +     2.3% (11)  2.6% (29)  +    
2003     3.2% (15)  4.7% (52)  +     3.0% (14)  4.0% (44)  +    
2004     4.3% (17)  6.1% (74)  +     1.8% (7)  4.6% (56)  +    
2005     7.0% (27)  8.1% (94)  +     5.4% (21)  4.8% (56)  -    
2006     5.3% (17)  9.8% (120)  +     5.6% (18)  8.2% (100)  +    
Mean  4.7%  6.7%  2.01% *** 3.4%  5.2%  1.76% ***
SD     (0.03)  (0.02)        (0.02)  (0.03)       
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Table 4: Golden Parachutes and Acquisition Likelihood  
Table 4 reports the results for pooled probit regressions. For columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is an 
indicator equaling 1 if the firm received a takeover bid in the next calendar year and zero otherwise; for columns (3) 
and (4) the dependent variable is an indicator equaling 1 if the firm was acquired in the next calendar year and zero 
otherwise. Standard controls are used in these specifications. Columns (1) and (2) differ according to how the 
industry effect is taken into account. All models estimated use cluster robust standard errors, clustering by 2-digit 
SIC industries, and have year fixed effects. Coefficients for industry and year fixed effects, as well as the constant 
term, are suppressed for ease of reporting. We report the marginal effect associated with GPs, using average values 
for all other controls. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Probit Dependent Var     Receive Bid Next Year     Acquired Next Year 
      (1)     (2)        (3)     (4)    
Golden Parachute     0.0186 
***  0.0175 
***     0.0164 
***  0.0157 
*** 
      (0.003)     (0.003)        (0.002)     (0.002)    
EIndex-GP     -0.0037 
**  -0.0044 
***     -0.0013     -0.0018 
* 
      (0.001)     (0.001)        (0.001)     (0.001)    
GIndex - EIndex     0.0004     0.0009        0.0008     0.001 
* 
      (0.001)     (0.001)        (0.001)     (0.001)    
Delaware Inc      0.0111 
***  0.0092 
***     0.007 
***  0.0071 
*** 
      (0.003)     (0.003)        (0.002)     (0.002)    
Log(Q)     -0.0147 
***  -0.0194 
***     -0.0048 
*  -0.0069 
** 
      (0.004)     (0.004)        (0.003)     (0.003)    
Log(Asset)     -0.0029 
***  -0.0058 
***     -0.0023 
***  -0.0041 
*** 
      (0.001)     (0.001)        (0.001)     (0.001)    
Log(Debt/Asset)     0.0089     0.0157 
**     -0.0047     -0.0029    
      (0.008)     (0.008)        (0.006)     (0.007)    
Inside Ownership     -0.0004     -0.0006 
**     -0.0002     -0.0003    
      (0.000)     (0.000)        (0.000)     (0.000)    
Log(CEO Age)     0.0029     0.0055        -0.0008     0.0002    
      (0.015)     (0.014)        (0.013)     (0.012)    
Log(CEO Tenure)     -0.0038 
**  -0.0039 
***     -0.0016     -0.0017    
      (0.002)     (0.001)        (0.001)     (0.001)    
Herfindahl Index     -0.0387 
***           -0.0302 
***       
      (0.011)              (0.009)          
Dependent Var Mean     0.0596     0.0598        0.0454     0.0456    
Proportional Marginal Effect     0.3121     0.2926        0.3612     0.3443    
Industry FE     No     Yes        No     Yes    
Pseudo R-squared     0.0400     0.0580        0.0640     0.0800    
Observations     23,794     23,732        23,794     23,662    
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Table 5: Golden Parachutes and Premiums in Acquisitions  
Table 5 reports pooled regression results of one-week and four-week acquisition premiums on target firm 
governance characteristics, fundamentals, and deal characteristics. Columns (1) and (2) use one-week premium and 
log of one-week premium as the dependent variables; columns (3) and (4) use four-week premium and log of four-
week premium as the dependent variables. All models include estimated 2-digit SIC industry and year fixed effects, 
and all estimations use cluster robust standard errors, clustering by 2-digit SIC industries, and have year and SIC2 
industry fixed effects. Coefficients for year and industry fixed effects and the constant term are suppressed. 
Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Dependent Var     1Wk Prem  ln(1Wk Prem)     4Wk Prem  ln(4Wk Prem) 
      (1)     (2)        (3)     (4)    
Golden Parachute     -0.0352 
**  -0.1298 
*     -0.0388 
*  -0.1828 
** 
      (0.017)     (0.078)        (0.020)     (0.089)    
EIndex-GP     0.0188 
***  0.0511 
*     0.0147     0.0362    
      (0.007)     (0.026)        (0.009)     (0.029)    
GIndex-EIndex     0.0047     0.0154        -0.0016     -0.0043    
      (0.004)     (0.019)        (0.005)     (0.015)    
Delaware Inc     0.0091     -0.033        0.0125     -0.0193    
      (0.014)     (0.057)        (0.017)     (0.070)    
Log(Q)     -0.028     -0.0071        -0.0289     -0.0051    
      (0.025)     (0.066)        (0.036)     (0.087)    
Log(Assets)     -0.0189     -0.0433        -0.022     -0.0631    
      (0.009)     (0.035)        (0.009)     (0.031)    
Debt/Asset     0.0602 
**  0.1999        0.0386 
**  0.2472 
** 
      (0.048)     (0.199)        (0.047)     (0.170)    
Inside Ownership     -0.0011     0.0011        -0.0022     -0.0047    
      (0.002)     (0.006)        (0.002)     (0.008)    
Hostile Bid     0.0968 
*  0.2695 
*     0.0579     0.2974 
*** 
      (0.054)     (0.140)        (0.040)     (0.106)    
Tender Offer     0.0639 
*  0.2283 
**     0.1033 
***  0.2694 
** 
      (0.033)     (0.090)        (0.037)     (0.114)    
Toehold     -0.001     -0.0037        -0.002     -0.0027    
      (0.002)     (0.006)        (0.001)     (0.005)    
Termination Fee     -0.007     -0.0013        -0.0004     0.1221    
      (0.023)     (0.070)        (0.021)     (0.089)    
Stock Swap     -0.0105     -0.1555 
*     -0.0175     -0.1631 
* 
      (0.025)     (0.081)        (0.024)     (0.084)    
Log(Time)     0.0143     0.0447        0.0106     0.0373    
      (0.021)     (0.066)        (0.024)     (0.067)    
Log(CEO Age)     -0.0904     -0.4266        -0.1927     -0.8904 
** 
      (0.132)     (0.483)        (0.126)     (0.410)    
Log(CEO Tenure)     0.0185     0.0988 
**     0.0139     0.064    
      (0.019)     (0.047)        (0.021)     (0.049)    
Adjusted R
2     0.1110     0.0770        0.1460     0.0730    
Observations     773     773        770     770    
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Table 6: Golden Parachutes and Expected Premiums from Acquisitions  
Table 6 reports pooled regression results of one-week and four-week acquisition premiums on target firm 
governance characteristics and fundamentals across all firms in the annual IRRC dataset, where any firm that did not 
undergo a completed acquisition over the next year has an acquisition premium of 0. Columns (1) and (2) use one-
week premium and log of one-week premium as the dependent variables; columns (3) and (4) use four-week 
premium and log of four-week premium as the dependent variables. All models include estimated 2-digit SIC 
industry and year fixed effects, and all estimations use cluster robust standard errors, clustering by 2-digit SIC 
industries, and have year and SIC2 industry fixed effects. Coefficients for year and industry fixed effects and the 
constant term are suppressed. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Dependent Var     1Wk Prem  log(1Wk Prem)     4Wk Prem  log(4Wk Prem) 
      (1)     (2)        (3)     (4)    
Golden Parachute     0.0033 
***  0.0345 
***     0.0033 
***  0.0327 
*** 
      (0.001)     (0.008)        (0.001)     (0.008)    
EIndex-GP     0.0002     -0.0020        0.0000     -0.0024    
      (0.000)     (0.003)        (0.000)     (0.003)    
GIndex-EIndex     0.0000     -0.0006        -0.0003     -0.0013    
      (0.000)     (0.002)        (0.000)     (0.002)    
Delaware Inc     0.0020 
*  0.0155        0.0022 
*  0.0159    
      (0.001)     (0.009)        (0.001)     (0.010)    
Log(Q)     -0.0032 
***  -0.0206 
*     -0.0033 
**  -0.0195    
      (0.001)     (0.011)        (0.001)     (0.012)    
Log(Assets)     -0.0025 
***  -0.0206 
***     -0.0029 
***  -0.0219 
*** 
      (0.000)     (0.003)        (0.000)     (0.003)    
Debt/Asset     -0.0012     -0.0199        0.0008     -0.0014    
      (0.003)     (0.027)        (0.005)     (0.034)    
Inside Ownership     -0.0002 
***  -0.0014 
**     -0.0002 
***  -0.0014 
** 
      (0.000)     (0.001)        (0.000)     (0.001)    
Log(CEO Age)     -0.0004     0.0232        0.0001     0.0183    
      (0.003)     (0.028)        (0.005)     (0.032)    
Log(CEO Tenure)     0.0003     0.0000        0.0002     0.0007    
      (0.000)     (0.004)        (0.000)     (0.004)    
Adjusted R
2     0.013     0.017        0.015     0.018    
Observations     23,577     23,577        23,577     23,574    
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Table 7: Fresh vs. Older GPs 
Panel A: Fresh and Older GPs and Acquisition Likelihood 
Table 7 reports marginal effects from pooled probit results. Results from columns (1) and (2) are comparable to 
those in Table 5, with the difference being that the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a firm was 
acquired by the current date of publication for the next IRRC volume. Columns (3) and (4) represent the same 
models as columns (1) and (2), respectively, but differentiate between “Old” and “Fresh” GPs, where fresh GP 
equals 1 if a firm does not have a GP in the previous IRRC volume but has GP in the current volume, and old GP 
equals 1 if a firm has a GP in both the previous and current IRRC volumes. All models estimated use robust cluster 
standard errors. Specifications (1) and (3) use the Herfindahl Index as industry control, while (2) and (4) use 2-digit 
SIC industry fixed effects. Standard errors are reported below marginal effects in parentheses. Marginal effects for 
industry and year fixed effects, as well as the constant term, are not displayed. Significance levels are indicated by *, 
**, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Probit Dependent Var     Acquired by Next IRRC Vol     Acquired by Next IRRC Vol 
      (1)     (2)        (3)     (4)    
Golden Parachute     0.0328 
***  0.0326 
***                
      (0.005) 
   (0.005) 
                 
Fresh GP                    0.0395 
***  0.0404 
*** 
        
     
      (0.012) 
   (0.012) 
  
Older GP                    0.0302 
***  0.0319 
*** 
        
     
      (0.006) 
   (0.006) 
  
EIndex-GP     -0.0012     -0.0019        -0.0001     -0.0009    
      (0.002) 
   (0.002) 
      (0.002) 
   (0.002) 
  
GIndex - EIndex     0.0014     0.0019        0.0011     0.0016    
      (0.001) 
   (0.001) 
      (0.001) 
   (0.001) 
  
Delaware Inc     0.0151     0.0144 
*     0.0162 
***  0.0157 
*** 
      (0.005) 
   (0.005) 
      (0.005) 
   (0.005) 
  
Log(Q)     -0.0041 
***  -0.0089 
***     -0.0031     -0.0078    
      (0.005) 
   (0.005) 
      (0.005) 
   (0.005) 
  
Log(Assets)     -0.0057     -0.009        -0.0062 
***  -0.0099 
*** 
      (0.002) 
   (0.002) 
      (0.002) 
   (0.002) 
  
Debt/Assets     0.0024 
***  0.0078 
***     0.0055     0.0111    
      (0.012) 
   (0.012) 
      (0.012) 
   (0.013) 
  
Inside Ownership     -0.0016 
***  -0.0017 
***     -0.0016 
***  -0.0017 
*** 
      (0.000) 
   (0.000) 
      (0.000) 
   (0.000) 
  
Log(CEO Age)     -0.0092     -0.0068        -0.0102     -0.0078    
      (0.028) 
   (0.027) 
      (0.028) 
   (0.027) 
  
Log(CEO Tenure)     -0.0048 
*  -0.0053 
**     -0.0049 
*  -0.0055 
** 
      (0.003) 
   (0.003)        (0.003) 
   (0.003)    
Herfindahl Index     -0.0358 
**           -0.0369 
**       
      (0.018) 
            (0.018)          
Dependent Var Mean     0.0985     0.0990        0.0985     0.0990    
Proportional Marginal Effect 
    
0.3330 
    
0.3293 
       
 0.4010 
[0.3066]    
0.4081 
[0.3222]    
Industry FE     No     Yes        No     Yes    
Pseudo R
2     0.1930     0.2080        0.1920     0.2070    
Observations     12,236     12,173        12,236     12,173    
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Panel B: Fresh and Older GPs and Expected Premiums from Acquisitions 
This table reports pooled regression results of one-week and four-week acquisition premiums on target firm 
governance characteristics and fundamentals across all firms in the IRRC volume dataset, where any firm that did 
not undergo a completed acquisition over the next year has an acquisition premium of 0. Columns (1) and (2) use 
one-week premium and log of one-week premium as the dependent variables; columns (3) and (4) use four-week 
premium and log of four-week premium as the dependent variables. All models include estimated 2-digit SIC 
industry and year fixed effects, and all estimations use cluster robust standard errors, clustering by 2-digit SIC 
industries, and have year and SIC2 industry fixed effects. Coefficients for year and industry fixed effects and the 
constant term are suppressed. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Dependent Var     1Wk Prem  ln(1Wk Prem)     4Wk Prem  ln(4Wk Prem) 
      (1)     (2)        (3)     (4)    
Fresh GP     0.0116 
***  0.1020 
***     0.0139 
***  0.1115 
*** 
      (0.004) 
   (0.030) 
      (0.004) 
   (0.030) 
  
Older GP     0.0095 
***  0.0876 
***     0.0100 
***  0.0855 
*** 
      (0.001) 
   (0.013) 
      (0.002) 
   (0.013) 
  
EIndex-GP     -0.0001     -0.0024        -0.0004     -0.0027    
      (0.001) 
   (0.004) 
      (0.001) 
   (0.004) 
  
GIndex-EIndex     0.0005     0.0034        0.0004     0.0033    
      (0.000)  
   (0.003) 
      (0.000) 
   (0.003) 
  
Delaware Inc     0.0000     -0.0035        0.0004     -0.0008    
      (0.001) 
   (0.012) 
      (0.002) 
   (0.012) 
  
Log(Q)     0.0001     0.0086        0.0007     0.0124    
      (0.001) 
   (0.008) 
      (0.001) 
   (0.008) 
  
Log(Assets)     0.0000     0.0013        0.0000     0.001    
      (0.000)  
   (0.003) 
      (0.000) 
   (0.003) 
  
Debt/Asset     -0.0030     -0.0361        -0.0017     -0.0259    
      (0.003) 
   (0.023) 
      (0.004) 
   (0.025) 
  
Inside Ownership     -0.0002 
***  -0.0020 
***     -0.0003 
***  -0.0019 
*** 
      (0.000) 
   (0.001) 
      (0.000) 
   (0.001) 
  
Log(CEO Age)     -0.0024     -0.0293        -0.0027     -0.0291    
      (0.002) 
   (0.019) 
      (0.002) 
   (0.019) 
  
Log(CEO Tenure)     0.0007 
***  0.0054 
***     0.0007 
***  0.0052 
*** 
      (0.000)     (0.002)        (0.000)     (0.002)    
Adjusted R
2     0.064     0.083        0.063     0.083    
Observations     13,588     13,588        13,589     13,589    
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Table 8: Stock Returns and Golden Parachutes: Value-Weighted 
Table 8 Panel A (B) reports monthly abnormal returns estimated from regressing monthly value-weighted “VW” 
(equal-weighted “EW”) portfolio returns on the three Fama-French (Fama and French 1993) factors and the Carhart 
(1997) momentum factor. Column (1) in each panel considers the strategy for the period September 1990–December 
2003 that goes long a portfolio of stocks that adopt GPs two volumes from the current one (i.e., do not have GPs in 
the current and next IRRC volumes but do have GPs in the following one) and simultaneously shorts the portfolio of 
stocks that do not have GPs in the current and succeeding two IRRC volumes. Column (2) in each panel considers 
the trading strategy for the period September 1990–December 2005 that goes long a portfolio of stocks that adopt 
GPs in the next IRRC volume and simultaneously shorts the portfolio of stocks that do not have GPs between the 
current and succeeding IRRC volumes. Columns (3) and (4) consider the trading strategy for the period July 1993–
December 2005 that goes long the portfolio of stocks that have GPs as of the current date in the previous IRRC 
volume as well as in the next IRRC volumes and simultaneously shorts the portfolio of stocks that do not have GPs 
in the previous, current, and next IRRC volumes. Column (4) differs from column (3) by including all firms 
acquired between the current and the following IRRC volumes, and reinvesting toward the rest of the respective 
portfolio on the long and the short side. None of the strategies is implementable in real time as each requires future 
information. Long and short portfolios were adjusted when updated information on firm corporate governance 
provisions became available: July 1993; July 1995; February 1998; February 2000; February 2002; January 2004; 
January 2006. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients, and levels of significance 
are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Dep Var  Monthly VW Portfolio Returns 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Long: 
 
Future-Adopters 
 
Adopters 
 
LT Adopters 
 
LT Adopters 
(w/ acquired) 
Short: 
 
Non- 
Future-Adopters  
Non-Adopters 
 
LT Non-Adopters 
 
LT Non-Adopters 
(w/ acquired) 
Alpha -0.0059 
*** -0.0037 
*** -0.0037 
** -0.0032 
** 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Rm-Rf 0.0034  -0.032  0.0183  0.0155 
   (0.056)  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.040) 
SMB 0.0834  0.2017 
*** 0.1203 
*** 0.1189 
   (0.067)  (0.050)  (0.040)  (0.041) 
HML 0.2827 
*** 0.212 
*** 0.5274 
*** 0.5306 
*** 
   (0.096)  (0.066)  (0.062)  (0.062) 
Carhart -0.0175  -0.0585  0.0285  0.0269 
   (0.043) 
  (0.025) 
  (0.028) 
  (0.028) 
  
N 160  184  150  150 
Adj. R
2  0.0861     0.1185     0.5094     0.5156    
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Table 9: Stock Returns and Golden Parachutes – Equal-Weighted 
Table 9 Panel A (B) reports monthly abnormal returns estimated from regressing monthly value-weighted “VW” 
(equal-weighted “EW”) portfolio returns on the three Fama-French (Fama and French 1993) factors and the Carhart 
(1997) momentum factor. Column (1) in each panel considers the strategy for the period September 1990–December 
2003 that goes long a portfolio of stocks that adopt GPs two volumes from the current one (i.e., do not have GPs in 
the current and next IRRC volumes but do have GPs in the following one) and simultaneously shorts the portfolio of 
stocks that do not have GPs in the current and succeeding two IRRC volumes. Column (2) in each panel considers 
the trading strategy for the period September 1990–December 2005 that goes long a portfolio of stocks that adopt 
GPs in the next IRRC volume and simultaneously shorts the portfolio of stocks that do not have GPs between the 
current and succeeding IRRC volumes. Columns (3) and (4) consider the trading strategy for the period July 1993–
December 2005 that goes long the portfolio of stocks that have GPs as of the current date in the previous IRRC 
volume as well as in the next IRRC volumes and simultaneously shorts the portfolio of stocks that do not have GPs 
in the previous, current, and next IRRC volumes. Column (4) differs from column (3) by including all firms 
acquired between the current and the following IRRC volumes, and reinvesting toward the rest of the respective 
portfolio on the long and the short side. None of the strategies is implementable in real time as each requires future 
information. Long and short portfolios were adjusted when updated information on firm corporate governance 
provisions became available: July 1993; July 1995; February 1998; February 2000; February 2002; January 2004; 
January 2006. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients, and levels of significance 
are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Dep Var  Monthly EW Portfolio Returns 
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Long:  Future-Adopters  Adopters  LT Adopters  LT Adopters       
(w/ acquired) 
Short: Non- 
Future-Adopters 
Non-Adopters  LT Non-Adopters  LT Non-Adopters 
(w/ acquired) 
Alpha -0.0059 
***  -0.002 
* -0.0028 
*** -0.0024 
** 
   -0.002  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Rm-Rf 0.0034  -0.0195 0.0127  0.013 
   -0.056  -0.027 -0.021 -0.023 
SMB 0.0834  0.131 
*** 0.0242  0.0141 
   -0.067  -0.037 -0.028  -0.03 
HML 0.2827 
***  0.0942 
* 0.2904 
*** 0.2866 
*** 
   -0.096  -0.051 -0.031 -0.033 
Carhart -0.0175  -0.1262 
*** 0.0063  0.0133 
   -0.043 
   -0.024 
  -0.013 
  -0.013 
  
N  160  184 150 150 
Adj. R
2  0.0861     0.2695     0.4876     0.4755    
 
 
 